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Learning from failures in the 2011 uprisings 
 
Thomas Davies 
Department of International Politics, City University London 
 
Until recently the study of strategic nonviolent action has, as Erica Chenoweth 
and Maria Stephan argue, been considered to be ‘something of a pariah’ in 
strategic studies.1 It is in this context that literature on the subject has tended to 
concentrate on apparently successful cases of nonviolent resistance, which has 
helped to secure its position alongside traditional military strategic analysis in a 
growing array of literature.2  
 
In his response my article on strategic nonviolent action in the 2011 uprisings in 
Bahrain, Egypt, Libya and Syria, Brian Martin observes that ‘many lessons’ may 
be learned from instances of failure. His analysis is particularly helpful for 
pointing towards a number of aspects of nonviolent strategic thought that may 
be reconsidered and improved in the light of the experience of the 2011 
uprisings. 
 
Among the key contributions in Martin’s analysis is its elaboration on the need 
for more sophisticated consideration of the relationship between nonviolent 
actors and armed forces. A central claim in literature on strategic nonviolent 
action has been that persuading loyalty shifts among the armed forces can be 
crucial to success of a nonviolent campaign.3 As my article indicated, the 
experience of the 2011 uprisings indicates key potential problems in this 
relationship, such as legitimation of military pre-eminence in Egypt, and helping 
to facilitate splits in the armed forces that contributed towards civil war in Libya 
and Syria. Martin’s analysis helpfully indicates some of the potential methods of 
                                                        
1 Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan, Why Civil Resistance Works: Why Civil Resistance Works: 
The Strategic Logic of Nonviolent Conflict (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), p. 17. 
2 See, for instance, Lawrence Freedman, Strategy: A History (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2013), chapter 23. 
3 Maria J. Stephan and Erica Chenoweth, ‘Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of 
Nonviolent Conflict", International Security 33:1 (2008): 42. 
more effective fraternisation with armed forces that deserve far greater 
attention than they have received to date. 
 
Martin’s analysis is also helpful for its clarification of the roles of dispersion and 
concentration in nonviolent action. A key distinction that is sometimes 
overlooked is between methods of concentration that are widely dispersed, such 
as protests in multiple cities, and methods of dispersion such as strikes and 
symbolic actions. As my article notes, the 2011 uprisings involved both methods 
of concentration that were widely dispersed and methods of dispersion such as 
the strike actions in Bahrain, Egypt and Syria. The distinction Martin highlights 
with respect to forms of dispersion is a significant one, but adoption of both 
strategies was insufficient to prevent the failures in the uprisings in these 
countries. 
 
There is a significant contrast between understandings of the definitions of 
success and failure for strategic nonviolent action in Martin’s analysis, and those 
put forward in my article. Strategists of nonviolent action need to consider 
carefully whether use of force legitimated with reference to attacks on peaceful 
protesters is merely ‘one particular technique in a wider package of outrage 
management methods’ or a mode of failure that nonviolent strategists should 
seek to avert. 
 
According to Martin, ‘most nonviolence scholars would concur’ that the 2011 
uprising in Egypt was a success for strategic nonviolent action, with a 
‘reasonably free election’ taking place in 2012. This appears to be in sharp 
contrast to analyses from beyond their discipline, where it has been emphasised 
that the aftermath of the uprising was not regime change, but rather ‘appears to 
have amounted to an intra-regime coup, with the military faction prevailing over 
a rival business faction.’4 If the criteria Martin uses to deem the Egyptian 
uprising to be successful were to be applied to violent strategy, it could be 
argued that the military invasion of Iraq in 2003 was a ‘success’, given the 
                                                        
4 Ewan Stein, ‘Revolution or Coup? Egypt’s Fraught Transition’, Survival: Global Politics and 
Strategy, 54:4 (2012): 45-66. 
‘reasonably free’ elections that took place subsequent to the invasion, a 
conclusion with which many would not concur.  
 
If it is the aim of strategists of nonviolent action to be considered on the same 
terms as strategists of violent action, the failures of strategic nonviolence need to 
be subjected to the same critical scrutiny as the failures of violent strategy. In his 
conclusion, Martin suggests that the reader should return to Gene Sharp’s 
original formulation of the dynamics of nonviolent action, especially laying the 
groundwork and ensuring nonviolent discipline, rather than the dynamics of 
failure set out in my article. However, the role of nonviolence in legitimating the 
use of force by other actors, is not, as Martin argues, ‘a secondary issue’, but 
instead should be a key concern in nonviolent strategic analysis. In elaborating 
on effective methods of fraternisation with armed forces, Martin makes his most 
helpful contribution to advancement of non-violent strategic thought. We should 
also take into account the interplay of geopolitical and societal factors with the 
dynamics of failure, elaborated in my article but in need of further testing. As 
Martin argues, the expectations set in my article with respect to the diverse array 
of circumstances and dynamics that protesters need to take into account 
demands much more of nonviolent strategists than traditionally put forward. 
However, the invigoration of dictatorial rule in Bahrain and Egypt and the 
escalating violence in Libya and Syria since 2011 reveal how disastrous the 
consequences of failing to do so can be. 
